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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code § 38-1-11 (2001) ] : [Mechanics9 Liens] Enforcement -Time for -Lis
pendens -Action for debt not affected -Instructions and form affidavit and motion.
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the
residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to
enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon
which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38,
Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
Fund Act. (Emphasis added).

(4)(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the
residence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff/Appellee Joel Sill ("Sill") asks this Court to uphold a ruling of the Utah
Court of Appeals judicially rewriting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001)
("Subsection 4(a)") and applying it to facts outside of its express terms. Subsection 4(a)
The parties agree that the statutes determinative of this case are those that were
in place in February of 2002.

clearly and expressly states that it applies only to mechanics' lien claimants who file an
action and serve a "complaint" on the owner of residential property. Subsection 4(a) further
expressly states that what is to be served in such cases are instructions and forms regarding
"the owner's rights" or "available rights" which "the owner may exercise" under Utah's
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-101 et
seq. (the "LRFA"). In this case, it is undisputed that neither of those express conditions and
requirements for application of Subsection 4(a) exists. The Court of Appeals therefore erred
in reversing a well-reasoned decision of the district court, and holding Subsection 4(a)
required Defendant/Appellant Bill Hart d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart"), the defendant in
the case who never filed or served a complaint, to serve upon Sill, with Hart's answer which
included a counterclaim (the "Counterclaim"), instructions and forms relating to the LRFA,
even though Sill admittedly had no rights under the LRFA. Based upon that ruling which
impermissibly deviates from the plain language of the statute as chosen and drafted by the
Legislature, the Court of Appeals wrongly reversed an award to Hart of more than
$300,000.00 in prejudgment interest accrued on amounts owed by Sill, and attorney fees and
costs incurred by Hart in two years of litigation to collect the amounts Sill owed.
The Court of Appeals' ruling applying Subsection 4(a) to this case, and Sill's
arguments defending it, attempt to force the square peg of this case into the round hole of
Subsection 4(a). Such application is contrary to the plain language of Subsection 4(a)
specifically, and to the overarching purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes generally.
Hart also won a jury verdict awarding him the full principle amount of
$314,500.00 that he claimed was owed by Sill. During the pendency of this appeal, Sill
has paid that principal amount.

This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals, reinstate the district court's decision
declaring Subsection 4(a) inapplicable to this case, and reinstate the district court's award
of interest and attorney fees and costs to Hart.
In his cross-appeal Sill attacks that portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling that
Subsection 4(a) is not a "jurisdictional" statute. Since Subsection 4(a) does not apply to
begin with, this Court need not even reach the issue of whether it is jurisdictional. But
Sill's jurisdiction arguments also fail in any event. Sill bases his jurisdiction argument on
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e) (2001) ("Subsection 4(e)"), which states that if a lien
claimant fails to serve items required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant is "barred"
from maintaining or enforcing the lien. There is, however, nothing inherently
"jurisdictional" about the word "barred," and Sill fails to show any clearly expressed
intention of the Legislature that Subsections 4(a) or 4(e) limit jurisdiction, as is necessary
to overcome the established legal presumption of jurisdiction. Sill's analysis also fails to
view Subsection 4(a) in the context of the overall mechanics' lien statutes of which it is a
part. When viewed in that context, as required by the very authorities upon which Sill
himself relies, even where it applies Subsection 4(a) does not impose a jurisdictional bar.
This Court therefore should uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are not jurisdictional.

ARGUMENT
REPLY OF APPELLANT HART
TO SILL'S RESPONSE TO HART'S OPENING BRIEF
I.

APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION 4(a) TO THIS CASE IS CONTRARY
TO THE FACE OF THE STATUTE ITSELF AND THE RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A.

Subsection 4(a) Applies Specifically and Exclusively to Service of A
"Complaint," and Cannot Be Applied to Hart's Counterclaim

Subsection 4(a) expressly refers specifically and exclusively to a "complaint" as
the only pleading with which LRFA instructions and forms are to be served. The Court
of Appeals therefore erred in ruling that statute "does not require the service specifically
of a complaint," and that it applied to Hart's Counterclaim in this case. Sill v. Hart, 128
P.3d 1215, 1218,1} 9 (emphasis added) (a copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this
case is attached as Addendum No. 1 to Hart's opening brief to this Court).
The Court of Appeals', and Sill's, reliance on American Rural Cellular, Inc. v.
Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) is misplaced. That
case serves only to highlight that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to counterclaims.
American Rural held that "a counterclaim to foreclose a mechanics' lien ... clearly
qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien'" under the attorney fees provision of
the mechanics' lien statute. Id. at 193 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18). The Court of
Appeals and Sill argue in this case that Subsection 4(a) also applies to counterclaims
because it too refers to "an action" to enforce a mechanics' lien, and under American
Rural a counterclaim qualifies as "an action."

That, however, is only half of the analysis. As Sill himself correctly notes, "in
construing a statute a court assumes that when the Legislature enacted the statute, it was
aware of prior court decisions interpreting similar statutory language." (Sill's Brief, p. 9
(citing Donahue v. Warner Bro. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 261, 272 P.2d 177,
180 (1954)). It therefore must be assumed as a matter of law that when the Utah
Legislature enacted Subsection 4(a) in 2001 it was aware of the 1997 decision in
American Rural interpreting "action" to include counterclaims. Accordingly, had the
Legislature intended Subsection 4(a) to apply to counterclaims it would have left the term
"action" broad and unqualified as it did in the attorney fee provision that was the subject
of American Rural. The Legislature, however, did not do that. Instead, it added to the
term "action" a limiting reference specifically to a "complaint." That reference to a
"complaint" limits and qualifies the term "action," restricting application of
Subsection 4(a) to only an "action" where the lien claimant files and serves a
"complaint."
Well-settled rules of statutory construction provide that courts must "assume that
each term in the statute was used advisedly." E.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., 2004
UT App 143, \ 7, 91 P.3d 858, cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added).
Also, in statutory text the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, and
omissions in statutory language must be taken note of and given effect. E.g., State v.
Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 21, 64 P.3d 1218; Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001
UT App 354, f 11, 36 P.3d 528. As applied to this case, the Legislature's choice to add a
reference in Subsection 4(a) specifically to a "complaint" must be deemed to have been

purposefully and advisedly made, intending to and in fact distinguishing the term
"action" as used in Subsection 4(a) from its broader, unqualified application as used in
the attorney fee provision, limiting application of Subsection 4(a) to exclude any other
pleadings but a "complaint" from its reach. Such express reference to a "complaint"
should be respected and enforced by the courts. By ruling as it did that Subsection 4(a)
nevertheless applies to Hart's Counterclaim, the Court of Appeals strayed from the
express statutory language and violated each of those rules of statutory construction. It
also impermissibly inferred a substantive term into the statute (i.e. counterclaim) that
simply is not there, and improperly rendered meaningless Subsection 4(a)'s express and
exclusive reference to a "complaint" as the only pleading to which Subsection 4(a)
applies, all in violation of additional rules of statutory construction. See e.g., Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^ 30, 38 P.3d 291 (courts
must "not infer substantive terms into [statutory] text that are not already there"); Lund v.
Brown, 2001 UT 75, If 23, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) ("[A]ny interpretation which renders
parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.") (quotations and
citations omitted).

3

Sill's argument that the term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) "is used with no
qualifying or limiting language" and therefore is expanded by the word "action" to
include and apply to counterclaims (Sill's Brief, p. 9), is backwards. The term
"complaint" in Subsection 4(a) is the qualifying and limiting language, restricting the
term "action," which otherwise may have applied to all actions, including counterclaims,
as it does in the fee provision addressed in American Rural.
Sill's argument that restricting Subsection 4(a) to actions in which the lien
claimant serves a "complaint" somehow ascribes to the Legislature a "hide-the-ball
attitude" must be tongue-in-cheek. The Legislature can hardly be accused of hiding the
ball where it clearly and expressly stated on the face of Subsection 4(a) that it applies

Not only are they contrary to the language of Subsection 4(a) and established rules
of statutory construction, but Sill's arguments that "complaint" as used in Subsection 4(a)
includes counterclaims are not even supported by the authorities he cites. Each of those
authorities, State ex rel Road Comm 'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962),
Harmon v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695 (1943), Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627
(A.D. 1990), and Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1184 (3d ed. 2004),
spoke merely to the pleading standards required for counterclaims generally {i.e., that
they must state facts sufficient to support a claim for affirmative relief, as distinguished
from merely stating a defense to a plaintiffs complaint).4 None of them dealt with

only where a lien claimant files an action and serves a "complaint." It is instead the
interpretation offered by Sill whereby "complaint" would actually mean and include
things other than a complaint, that hides the ball.
4
In footnote 4 of his Brief, Sill argues that counterclaims and complaints are
interchangeable purportedly because "the courts - this Court included - frequently refer
to the pleading that sets forth a counterclaim as a 'counterclaim complaint.'" (Sill's
Brief, p. 13). Sill cites four cases in support of that broad claim: Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003
UT 11,1 1, 67 P.3d 1000; Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 138 (3rd
Cir. 2001); Foundation for Interior Design Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art &
Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co. v. Ellis, 28
F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994). Aside from the fact that four isolated references to use
of the made-up term "counterclaim complaint" in courts throughout the entire country are
hardly "frequent," none of Sill's four cited cases attached substantive significance to their
loose use of that term. Certainly none of those cases dealt with Subsection 4(a) which is
at issue in this case, nor even involved any statutory language expressly referring
specifically to a "complaint" as the pleading triggering application of certain statutory
requirements, as Subsection 4(a) does. This Court should not use a made up term like
"counterclaim complaint," whether the use of such term is "frequent" outside of the
mechanics' lien context or not, to circumvent the express language of Subsection 4(a),
and its specific reference to a "complaint." To do so would render the Legislature's use
of the term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) meaningless, "inoperative or superfluous
[and] is to be avoided." Lund, 11 P.3d at 282.

Subsection 4(a), nor involved construction of the word "complaint" or "counterclaim" as
any statutory term, which is the issue in this case.
Sill argues that in drafting Subsection 4(a) the Legislature "would have chosen"
the term "complaint" from the list of different pleadings with the intent that it "would
cover both an original complaint and a counterclaim," purportedly in light of what Sill
claims is "the prevailing view of courts and commentators that a counterclaim is a
complaint." (Sill's Brief, p. 14).5 It is fatal to Sill's argument that the Utah Legislature

5

Sill repeatedly refers throughout his brief to this purportedly "prevailing view."
None of the cases he cites, however, even support Sill's position. In fact, they ultimately
support Hart's position. For example, Sill's cited cases of Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d
251 (Ga. App. 1999), Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 533 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.N. Y.
1982), and Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 106 N.E. 541 (Ind. App. 1914) all equated
complaints with counterclaims because the legislatures had expressly done so in the
statutes there at issue. Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting statute which prohibited
bringing "a complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal custody" in various
circumstances, including "as a counterclaim"); Brink's, 533 F.Supp. at 1123 n.3 (quoting
statute that "cause of action contained in a counterclaim or cross-claim shall be treated, as
far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint"); Keeney, 106 N.E. at 542
(discussing statute under which a "counterclaim" was a pleading "which in another action
would entitle the defendant to a judgment against the plaintiff). Those statutes, and
therefore those cases, stand in stark contrast to Utah's Subsection 4(a) at issue in this
case, which refers exclusively to a "complaint," and draws no parallel at all between a
complaint and a counterclaim. As shown in the main text above, rules of statutory
construction require that the exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) must
be deemed to have been purposefully and advisedly adopted by the Legislature, and must
be respected and enforced by the courts.
Even the cases cited by Sill which held statutory uses of the word "complaint"
applied to counterclaims do not help Sill's position in this case. The history of
Subsection 4(a)'s use of the term "complaint" makes that statute unique and
distinguishable from the use of that term generally in other states' statutes in Sill's cited
cases of Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plant Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150 (D. Med. 2005)
and Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 189 A.2d 428 (Del. 1963). As shown in the main text
above, it has previously been held in Utah that the term "action" standing alone in Utah's
mechanics' lien statutes includes and applies to counterclaims. American Rural Cellular,
939 P.2d at 193. Addition of the term "complaint" in Subseclion 4(a), therefore, was as a

specifically uses the term "counterclaim" when it intends a statute to apply to
counterclaims. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2005) (stating parties may not
maintain "any action, suit, counterclaim cross complaint, or proceeding" unless certain
requirements are met) (emphasis added); id., § 78-7-35 (separately delineating filing fees
applicable to a "complaint," and to a "counterclaim," and other pleadings) (emphasis
added).6

limiting term, restricting the term "action," which otherwise, standing alone, would have
applied to a counterclaim, to mean and refer instead specifically and only to a
"complaint." The Court therefore should not in this case construe the statutory term
"complaint" broadly to apply to other pleadings such as counterclaims.
Lebrecht v. Orefice, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. 1951), cited by Sill, merely held that
a statute allowing re-filing of an "action" applied equally to complaints and
counterclaims. Since the term "action" as used in Subsection 4(a) is specifically limited
to one in which a "complaint" is filed, Lebrecht is inapposite. Liberty Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Rainey, 791 N. E.2d 625 (111. App. 2003), also cited by Sill, also is inapposite because it
dealt with construction of terms under a private contract rather than a statute, and its
ruling that the term "complaint" as used in the contract broadly included counterclaims
was specifically due to a public policy at work in that case favoring having disputes
submitted to arbitration where a contract calls for arbitration. That public policy simply
is not implicated in the case at bar. As discussed more fully in the main text below, the
public policy implicated in this case is the statutory protection of parties who, like Hart,
work to improve real property. That policy of course favors a construction of
"complaint" to exclude and not apply to Hart's Counterclaim.
6
In footnote 6 of his Brief, Sill attempts to distinguish these two statutes
"because they did not mirror the context in which "complaint" is used in
subsection (4)(a)." (Emphasis in original). Sill misses the point that what those statutes
show is that the Legislature knows how to state that a statute is to apply to a counterclaim
when it intends that result, as distinguished from Subsection 4(a) in this case which
specifically, expressly, and exclusively used the term "complaint." Sill's citation to
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also is fatal to his attempt to blur the
distinction between a counterclaim and a complaint because Rule 8(a) on its face
distinguishes between those documents, specifically using the term "counterclaim" where
it intended Rule 8 to apply to a counterclaim. Sill's argument that "[n]othing in the plain
language of Rule 13(a) suggests that a counterclaim is not a complaint," is also totally
incorrect. Rule 7(a) identifies a complaint. Rule 13(a) separately identifies a
counterclaim, which is a part of an answer. There is nothing in Rule 13(a), or any other

B.

There Was Nothing To Serve Upon Sill On The Face Of
Subsection 4(a)

Subsection 4(a) expressly states that what is to be included "with the service of the
complaint on the owner of the residence" are:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act
[identified and referred to above, and hereinafter, as the "LRFA"]; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the
residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available
rights under [the LRFA]. [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) (emphasis added)].
Sill, however, did not have any rights under the LRFA in this case, as shown in
Hart's opening brief, and which Sill and the Court of Appeals acknowledge and admit.
There was therefore nothing to serve upon Sill on the face of Subsection 4(a) even if Hart
had filed and served a "complaint," which he did not.
Sill focuses on the part of Subsection 4(a) referring to the service of LRFA
instructions and forms by the 'lien claimant," which he argues applies broadly to general
contractors and subcontractors alike. That myopic focus, however, is unwarranted and
unavailing. It is well-established that when inteipreting a statute the Court should look to
"the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12
K 17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). Therefore, even for the sake of argument,
construing broadly who is subject to the requirements of Subsection 4(a) there still is the
rule of civil procedure, to suggest that a counterclaim is a complaint. Instead, those
pleadings are separately named and defined, and there are specific references to those
separate pleadings throughout the rules.

question of what is necessary to meet those requirements. What Subsection 4(a) requires
is service of forms relating to "the owner's rights under [the LRFA]," and "available
rights under [the LRFA]" which "the owner may exercise." Since Sill indisputably and
admittedly did not have any such rights in this case, there simply were no instructions or
forms required to be served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a). Sill's
position that Subsection 4(a) does not limit the requirement to serve LRFA forms and
instructions to situations where the owner is able to exercise LRFA rights is flatly
contrary to the statutory language.
Sill argues that lien claimants should not be allowed to make the determination of
whether an owner in a given case is eligible for relief under the LRFA. But the

Sill's citations to various mechanics' lien statutory sections do not support, and
actually undermine, the Court of Appeals' application of Subsection 4(a) to this case. To
begin with, the sections Sill cites distinguishing between contractors and subcontractors
(i.e., Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-2, -14, & -17) are inapposite. Nothing in those sections
changes, nor does Sill even claim that they change, the fact that Sill had no rights under
the LRFA in this case.
Sill also cites to a provision of the LRFA which states "the original contractor ...
shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions are necessary for the owner
to be protected under" the LRFA. Id. § 38-11-108(1). Had the Legislature intended
Subsection 4(a) to apply to an "original contractor" such as Hart, it would have said so
expressly as it did in Section 38-11-108(1).
Next, Sill cites to the provisions in the mechanics' lien statutes regarding the
content required in all liens (id. § 38-l-7(2)(h)), and the limitations period for filing an
action to enforce a mechanics' lien (id. § 38-l-7(3)(c)). Each of those provisions,
however, apply on their face to all liens and all lawsuits, without limitation or
qualification of any kind. In sharp contrast to such provisions, the Legislature expressly
limited the circumstances to which Subsection 4(a) applies and in which LRFA
instructions and forms must be served to only those in which the lien claimant files the
lawsuit and serves a "complaint" on the owner, and even then only if "the owner" has
"available rights" under the LRFA that he "may exercise."

Legislature itself has already made the determination that they should, stating in
Subsection 4(a) that what is to be served are instructions and forms relating to "the
owner's rights" "available" and that "the owner may exercise." As with any statutory
language, it is the party itself who must make the determination in the first instance
whether the language applies to their situation and requires any action by them. In an
appropriate case a court may later find a lien claimant made an incorrect determination
and is therefore barred by Subsection 4(a) for failing to serve an owner with LRFA
instructions and forms to which they were entitled. But this is not such a case. Here, it is
admitted by Sill, and otherwise, indisputable, that Sill had no rights under the LRFA as
against his unpaid general contractor, Hart. There were therefore no LRFA forms or
Q

instructions required to be served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a).

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION UNDERMINES THE INTENT
AND PURPOSES OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES
Sill's Brief several times references the importance of evaluating the context in

which statutory language appears, and the legislative intent and "purpose the statute was
meant to achieve." (Sill's Brief, p. 20 (quoting Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist. v.
Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1f 8, 94 P.3d 234)). Sill readily acknowledges that the
Sill's attempt to compare Hart's arguments in this case to those made in
Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) is without merit. The argument in Landmark was that the court should carve out
an exception to the statutory requirement based on the legal sophistication of the party
entitled to notice. Id. at 261-62. By contrast, in the case at bar the question at issue is
whether Subsection 4(a) applies to this case at all to begin with. Hart is not arguing for
an exception to, but rather seeks judicial enforcement of, the statutory language defining
and limiting the scope and extent of the statute's applicability on its face.

intent and purpose of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes, of which Subsection 4(a) is a part,
has been long and repeatedly recognized to be, and is, to protect those like Hart who
perform labor and furnish materials for the improvement of real property. He
nevertheless argues to uphold the Court of Appeals' opinion which changes the plain
language of Subsection 4(a) and extends it to facts and circumstances to which on its face
it clearly does not apply (i.e., the counterclaim of an unpaid general contractor, in favor
of an owner with no right or ability to use the LRFA referenced forms and instructions).
This is all to the detriment of, and is an impediment to, recovery by Hart whom the jury
found substantially improved Sill's property. That result is contrary to the well-settled
and admitted intent of the mechanics' lien statutes. In attempting to defend that result
Sill argues that compliance with provisions of the mechanics' lien statutes is required
before one is entitled to their benefits and protections. That, of course, begs the question
of whether Subsection 4(a) is a requirement that applies to Hart. On its face it is not, for
all other reasons discussed above.
Sill's argument that the appellate court's ruling is not a windfall to him is false.
That ruling opens a window for Sill to evade payment of more than $300,000.00 in
prejudgment interest and attorney fees accrued on and incurred to recover the amount
which the jury found he rightfully owed to Hart (the full principal amount claimed by
Hart). It is undisputed by Sill that recovery of attorney fees and interest, in addition to
the principal amount owed, is a vitally important part of the mechanics' lien system.
E.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, If 24, 94 P.3d 270,
276 (noting attorney fee provision strengthens protection of lien statute "by ensuring

someone who successfully uses a mechanics' lien to enforce a payment obligation ... will
not ultimately bear the legal costs of that enforcement action. It also functions as a
penalty for one who wrongly fails to pay for enhancement to his property."); Triple I
Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1998) (stating general rule that
unpaid mechanic is entitled to interest). Allowing evasion of those substantial amounts
by Sill as the Court of Appeals' ruling would, is an enormous windfall in a case where
service of the LRFA forms and instructions, even if they were required, admittedly could
not have made any difference whatsoever to the outcome of this case.
Allowing such windfalls to delinquent property owners like Sill, at the expense of
contractors like Hart, is contrary to the mechanics' lien statutes' purpose, particularly
when based upon novel interpretations of isolated procedural provisions that apply them
beyond their clear, plain and express language to require actions from unpaid contractors
admittedly of no use or benefit at all to the owner. This Court therefore should reverse
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the ruling of the district court that Subsection 4(a)
simply does not apply to this case.
HART'S OPPOSITION TO SILL'S CROSS-APPEAL
Sill's Cross-Appeal attacks the portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling confirming
that, even where it applies, Subsection 4(a) is not "jurisdictional" in nature. Sill's
argument in this regard actually is an attack upon the Court of Appeals' ruling in the case
of Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, 121 P.3d 717, which previously ruled Subsection
4(a) does not divest the court of jurisdiction over lien claims and upon which the Court of
Appeals largely relied in this case. Sill's attacks upon Pearson and arguments that

Subsection 4(a) is jurisdictional are without merit. The Pearson ruling is well-reasoned
and sound. Moreover, many of Sill's cited authorities actually also confirm that
Subsection 4(a) indeed is not jurisdictional. This Court therefore should uphold the Court
of Appeals' ruling in this case that Subsection 4(a) is not a jurisdictional bar to Hart's
mechanics' lien claims in any event.
I.

PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONFIRM THAT
SUBSECTION 4(a) IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL
Sill argues that Pearson overlooked the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-

1 l(4)(e) (2001) ("Subsection 4(e)") and rendered that statute meaningless in violation of
rules of statutory construction in holding it was not jurisdictional.9 In its entirety,
Subsection 4(e) states:
If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the instructions
and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be
barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence.

9

Sill cites the rules of statutory construction requiring construction of statutes
"according to their plain meaning ... giving meaning to all parts, and avoid rendering
portions of the statute superfluous." (Sill's Brief p. 35 (quoting LKL Assoc, Inc. v.
Farley, 2004 UT 51, \ 7, 94 P.3d 279)). He notes the rules of statutory construction
requiring the courts to "presume the legislature used each term advisedly" and to give
effect to "every word" chosen by the Legislature. (Id., p. 36 (quoting State v. Maestas,
2002 UT 123,fflf52-53, 63 P.3d 621). Finally, he acknowledges that the ultimate goal of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent and purpose
underlying the statute. (Id., pp. 35-36). The irony of Sill's citation to statutory
construction rules for his jurisdiction argument is that all of those rules and aims of
statutory construction highlight and confirm that Subsection 4(a) on its face simply does
not apply to this case to begin with, for all of the reasons shown more fully above,
rendering all of his arguments as to the purported jurisdictional nature of Subsection 4(a)
irrelevant.

Sill argues that in stating a lien claim is "barred" if a lien claimant fails to comply
with Subsection 4(a), Subsection 4(e) attaches a consequence to that failure to comply.
The existence of that consequence, Sill argues, makes the statute jurisdictional. But Sill's
jurisdiction argument rests entirely on the flawed premise that the term "barred" in
Subsection 4(e) per se imposes a jurisdictional consequence or bar, as opposed to a mere
procedural bar or affirmative defense. That premise is unsupported by, and indeed
contrary to, Utah law.
The starting point for analyzing whether a statute has jurisdictional implications is
the legal presumption that "district courts retain their grant of constitutional jurisdiction
in the absence of a clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction." Labelle v.
McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15 at % 8, 89 P.3d 113,114 (emphasis added). Sill
completely fails to show any clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction in
Subsections 4(a) and 4(e), nor indeed is there any. Nothing in the word "barred" is
inherently jurisdictional in nature. In its plain and ordinary meaning, "barred" is defined
to mean "[s]ubject to hindrance or obstruction by a bar or barrier which, if interposed,
will prevent legal redress or recovery." Black's Law Diet, at 150 (6th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added). There is absolutely nothing in that definition, nor otherwise in the
language of Subsection 4(e), supporting Sill's contention that use of the word "barred" in
Subsection 4(e) was intended by the Utah Legislature to impose a jurisdictional bar to
suit. To the contrary, the fact that the definition of "barred" includes only "if interposed"
supports the appellate court's rulings in Pearson, and in this case, that Subsection 4(e) is

not jurisdictional, but is a mere procedural bar, an affirmative defense only that is subject
to being waived.
Uses of the term "barred" in other Utah law support this analysis. For example,
Utah Code § 34A-3-109(2)(a), for example, states that a "claim described in
Subsection (2)(b) is barred/' unless certain requirements are met by the claimant within a
certain time. (Emphasis added). It has been recognized, however, that the statute is an
affirmative defense, and is not jurisdictional. See Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor
Comm n, 2005 UT App 401, f 19, n. 7; 122 P.3d 700 (Orme, J., concurring). Many other
affirmative defenses are said to "bar" enforcement of otherwise valid actions, without
being jurisdictional. See e.g., Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City,
2004 UT App 436, f 23, 104 P.3d 646, 652 (holding claim was "barred" by the statute of
limitations); Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118, ^ 10, 90 P.3d 649, 652 (subsequent
action seeking the same relief as a prior action is "barred by res judicata) (emphasis
added); Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, % 28, 57 P.3d 603, 610
("Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one party causing a
disadvantage to the other party."). There are many potential "bars" to suit. Labeling
something as a "bar," however, does not per se make the "bar" jurisdictional, as opposed
to merely procedural in nature.
Sill's argument that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are "jurisdictional" also ignores the
well-settled principal of statutory construction, properly applied in Pearson, that when
analyzing whether a provision is "jurisdictional," the Court must look at the statutory

language and the intent of the overall statute as a whole. As this Court stated in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978):
There is no universal rule by which directory [not-jurisdictional] provisions
may, under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are
mandatory [jurisdictional]. The intention of the legislature, however,
should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word form
should stand in the way of the legislative intent... The statute should be
construed according to its subject matter and the purpose for which it was
enacted.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah
1980) ("A statute is, of course, to be construed in light of its intended purposes."); Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (whether a statutory
requirement is jurisdictional depends upon whether "it is of the essence of the thing to be
done," viewing the intent of the statute as a whole).
In Pearson, the court properly applied these rules of statutory interpretation when
it undertook a thoughtful analysis of Subsection 4(e) within the overall context and
purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes as a whole. Pearson correctly concluded that
Subsection 4(a) is not essential to the core purposes of those statutes (i.e., to protect
parties like Hart who provide labor and material to improve real property), and that
service of LRFA instructions and forms under Subsection 4(a) is not "jurisdictional"
because it is a "minor component" of the overall mechanics' lien statutory scheme, is
"wholly informational," and noncompliance with it would not prejudice the other party.
Pearson, 2005 UT App. 383 at ^ 7 & 12, 121 P.3d at 719 & 721 (citing Labelle, 2004
UT 15 at % 17, 89 P.3d at 116). A copy of the Pearson case is attached hereto as an
addendum.

Contrary to Sill's claims, nothing in Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) is ignored or
rendered obsolete or meaningless by the holdings in Pearson, and in this case, that they
are not "jurisdictional." Those rulings leave intact the ability of a property owner to
invoke those statutes as a procedural bar, as an affirmative defense, in those cases where
Subsection 4(a) applies. The fact that the consequence or "bar" of Subsection 4(e) is a
procedural defense, rather than a jurisdictional one, does not render it meaningless,
particularly in light of the complete absence of any clearly expressed legislative intent to
limit jurisdiction.
II.

THE "TWO-PRONGED CONSEQUENCES" OF SUBSECTION 4(e) DO
NOT RAISE THE "BAR" TO A JURISDICTIONAL STATUS
Throughout the briefing and argument of this issue Sill's argument historically has

always been that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) rob the courts of jurisdiction to enforce
mechanics' lien claims. In his Brief to this Court, Sill now argues for the first time that
there are "two-pronged consequences" to Subsection 4(a) and 4(e). Apparently
recognizing that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) do not impose a "jurisdictional" bar to
enforcing mechanics' liens, as shown above,

Sill now focuses instead on the word

Sill's emphasis heretofore has been on this Court's ruling in Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), and trying to equate Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) of the
mechanics' lien statutes to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA") notice of
claim provision that was held in Madsen to be jurisdictional. In his Brief to this Court,
however, Sill has significantly downplayed his reliance upon Madsen and the attempted
comparison of Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) to the UGIA. That obviously is because Madsen
and the UGIA actually further confirm that Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) are not
jurisdictional. As noted in Madsen, the UGIA notice provision was held to be
jurisdictional because it expressly required certain actions be taken before a party could
even file suit under it. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 249-50. By contrast, on its face
Subsection 4(a) expressly contemplates providing LRFA information and forms after suit

"maintaining" in the language of Subsection 4(e) which says certain lien claimants "shall
be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien." Sill now argues that imposes a second
prong consequence, automatically extinguishing a mechanics' lien upon a lien claimant's
failure to comply with Subsection 4(a). (Sill's Brief, pp. 34-35, 38).
There simply is no authority for Sill's automatic lien extinguishment argument.
Subsection 4(e) certainly does not say the lien is automatically extinguished if LRFA
instructions and forms are not served.11 Regardless of whether the focus is on the word
"maintaining" or on the word "enforcing," the operative term in Subsection 4(e) still is
"barred." As shown above, there is nothing "jurisdictional" about the term "barred." In
fact, Sill himself refers to Subsection 4(a) as a mere "procedural requirement^" and notes
the lack of service under it as a mere "procedural default." (Sill's Brief, pp. 28, 33,
and38).12

is already filed, "with the service of the complaint." Unlike UGIA, compliance with
Subsection 4(a) of the mechanics' lien statutes is not a precondition to filing suit, and
therefore is not jurisdictional.
11
The only case cited by Sill in purported support of his automatic lien
extinguishment argument \sAAA Fencing v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289
(Utah 1989). That case, however, did not deal at all with Subsections 4(a) or 4(e). It was
a statute of limitations case dealing with timely filing of a lien foreclosure lawsuit, which
is fundamentally different than Subsection 4(a) which deals with procedures and defenses
available after suit is filed.
12

Even if Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) applied to this case at all, which they do not,
failure to serve the notices referenced in those statutes would at most give rise to an
affirmative defense for insufficiency of process, which was waived by Sill proceeding
through more than two years of litigation and up to trial before ever mentioning it. The
cases of Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Keller v. Southwood N.
Med. Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998) are instructive. The statute at issue in those
forcible entry cases required a court indorsement to be placed on the summons served
with the complaint. The plaintiffs in both cases failed to obtain that court indorsement.

III.

THE PEARSON COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE LACK OF
PREJUDICE AS A RELEVANT FACTOR IN ITS JURISDICTIONAL
ANALYSIS
Sill's argument that the lack of prejudice to the owner of a residence has no place

in the analysis of whether Subsection 4(a) is jurisdictional is directly contrary to
controlling Utah law. Lack of prejudice is a long and well-recognized factor that is to be
considered in jurisdictional analyses. This Court has explained: "[a] designation is
merely directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with a view merely to the
proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business, and by the failure to obey no
prejudice will occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Beaver County
v. Utah State Tax Comm % 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (quoting Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis added); see also
e.g., Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15 at \ 17, 89 P.3d at 116 (holding
statutory requirement that request for prelitigation panel review be mailed to the health
care providers in medical malpractice cases is not jurisdictional, including because "it is
difficult to envision how a health care provider could be prejudiced by being deprived of
a copy") (emphasis added). This Court also has included lack of prejudice as a factor
The court found that failure to comply with the statutory court indorsement requirement
gave rise to an insufficiency of process defense, but that the defendants had waived that
defense by not raising it until late in the litigation. Fowler, 838 P.2d at 677-78; Keller,
959 P.2d at 106. Just like the indorsement requirement under the statute at issue in
Fowler and Keller, where it applies Subsection 4(a) prescribes that certain information be
included with the service of process. Also just like Fowler and Keller, failure to serve
such items under Subsections 4(a) and 4(e) may arguably give rise to a defense for
insufficiency of process, but such defense would not automatically/?erse bar Hart's
mechanics' lien claims. Any such bar must be timely raised by an owner or it is waived.
Even if Subsection 4(a) applied to the facts of this case, Sill waived any defective service
defense under that statute by admittedly not mentioning it until the week before trial.

properly considered in evaluating the consequence for failures to meet requirements of
mechanics' lien statutes as well. See e.g., Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift
& Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1990) ("Unless we find that Projects' alleged
failures have compromised a purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, those failures will be
viewed as technical, and in the absence of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.")
(emphasis added).
Lack of prejudice, therefore indisputably is an appropriate part of the analysis as to
why Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional.

1 "\

In this case it is indisputable that there was

no prejudice to Sill. He admits that he had no rights against Hart under the LRFA.
Accordingly, he could not have made any use of nor benefited in any way from the
LRFA forms and instructions referenced in Subsection 4(a) even if he received them. He
therefore was not prejudiced one iota by not having received them. This Court should
therefore uphold that part of the Court of Appeals' ruling that, even if it applies to this
case to begin with, compliance with Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional.

13

Even Lyons v. PortAuth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 643 N.Y.S. 2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996), the sole authority upon which Sill relies in arguing to the contrary, does not
support him. That New York case held that consideration of prejudice was precluded
only after it had been determined that the applicable statute was jurisdictional. Id. at 57172 (finding first that "[compliance with the condition precedent in the statute of giving
sixty days notice is mandatory and jurisdictional," and only then stating the portion
quoted by Sill that consideration of whether the other party was prejudiced by the failure
to comply was immaterial because it was jurisdictional). That case does not hold (and
even if it did it would not be binding in the face of Utah's contrary law) that lack of
prejudice is irrelevant to determination of whether a statute is jurisdictional as an initial
threshold matter.

CONCLUSION
Where the Legislature specifically said in Subsection 4(a) that it applies only if a
lien claimant serves a "complaint" the Court of Appeals held the statute "does not
require the service specifically of a complaint." Where the Legislature specifically said
what is to be served under Subsection 4(a) are forms relating to "the owner's rights" that
are "available" and which "the owner may exercise" under the LRFA, the Court of
Appeals held the statute requires service even where the owner indisputably has no rights
under the LRFA. Each of those holdings are outside of and contrary to the plain
language of Subsection 4(a) specifically, and are contrary to rules governing construction
of mechanics' lien statutes generally. They each improperly punish Hart for not
providing forms that admittedly did not apply to this case and could not have changed its
outcome. This Court therefore should reverse the Court of Appeals on each or either of
those rulings, and reinstate the decision of the district court that Subsection 4(a) did not
apply to this case or require any action by Hart.
Even if Subsection 4(a) applied to this case (which it did not), the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that it is not jurisdictional. There simply is no clearly
expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction in or by Subsections 4(a) and 4(e), as is
necessary to overcome the legal presumption of jurisdiction. Nor is there any evidence
otherwise that any applicable consequence or bar under those post-filing procedural
sections was intended other than as an affirmative defense only. A jurisdictional bar also
would be contrary to the overall intent and purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes,
affording a large windfall to the owner in a case where there admittedly was never any

prejudice to the owner. This Court therefore should uphold the ruling that
Subsection 4(a) is not jurisdictional and otherwise is not any bar to Hart's mechanics'
lien Counterclaim, and should allow Hart to recover attorney fees, costs, and interest for
successfully prosecuting his mechanics' lien Counterclaim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^%JyofSeptember, 2006.
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Robert PEARSON dba Robert Pearson
Construction, Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v.
Suzanne J. LAMB, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 20040613-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 9, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 2005.
Background: Laborer filed complaint
seeking foreclosure of a mechanics' lien.
Following a bench trial, the Third District
Court, Silver Summit Department, Bruce
Lubeck, J., entered decision in favor of
laborer, and denied homeowner's motion
for a new trial. Homeowner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, James
Z. Davis, J., held that:
(1) laborer's failure to serve homeowner
with instructions and a form affidavit
did not divest trial court of jurisdiction
to hear action, and
(2) laborer was entitled to attorney fees
reasonably incurred on appeal.
Affirmed.
William A. Thorne Jr., J., concurred in result
only.
1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1)
Determination of whether trial court has
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law, which appellate court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the trial
court's determination.
2. Appeal and Error <£=>842(1)
Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the district
court's interpretation.
3. Mechanics' Liens <s>265
Mechanics' Liens Act's requirements
that lien claimant provide instructions and a
form affidavit along with the complaint were

directory, rather than mandatory, and, thus
laborer's failure to serve homeowner with
instructions and a form affidavit did not divest trial court of jurisdiction to hear laborer's mechanics' lien foreclosure action, where
laborer complied with Act to such an extent
that homeowner did not even notice laborer's
oversight for more than 18 months after
complaint was filed and more than one month
after homeowner stipulated that laborer had
complied with all statutory procedural requirements; laborer's failure to comply did
not compromise a purpose of Act, no consequences attached to laborer's failure to comply, and homeowner suffered no prejudice.
West's U.C.A. § 38-l-ll(4)(a).
4. Statutes <®=>227
Whether a procedure prescribed by statute is jurisdictional depends on whether the
procedure is mandatory or directory.
5. Statutes <3=>227
While a procedure prescribed by statute
is generally considered mandatory when consequences are attached to the failure to act,
the purpose of the statute and the legislature's intent are of the utmost importance.
6. Statutes <s=>227
There is no universal rule by which directory statutory provisions may, under all
circumstances, be distinguished from those
which are mandatory.
7. Statutes <S>227
A statutory designation is mandatory,
and therefore jurisdictional, if it is of the
essence of the thing to be done.
8. Mechanics' Liens @»3
Mechanics' Liens Act was passed primarily to protect laborers who have added
value to the property of another, but also to
protect the property owner's right to convey
clear title. West's U.C.A. § 38-1-1.
9. Statutes e=>227
Unlike mandatory statutory designations, a designation is merely "directory,"
and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is given
with a view merely to the proper, orderly,
and prompt conduct of the business, and by
the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to
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those whose rights are protected by the statute.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

10. Municipal Corporations <s>741.20
Party's failure to adhere to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim
requirement is fatal and can not be remedied. West's U.C.A. § 63-30d-402.
11. Mechanics' Liens <®=>260(6), 268
Party's failure to timely file a mechanics'
lien foreclosure action and lis pendens is fatal
and cannot be remedied. West's U.C.A.
§ 38-1-11(1, 2).
12. Mechanics' Liens <3=>260(6)
Penalty for not commencing an action to
enforce a mechanics' lien within the twelvemonth period provided by Mechanics' Liens
Act is invalidation of the lien. West's U.C.A.
§ 38-1-11(1).
13. Mechanics' Liens <3=>268
When a claimant fails to file a lis pendens within the twelve-month period provided by Mechanics' Liens Act, the mechanics'
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is
rendered void as to everyone except those
named in the action to enforce the lien and
those with actual knowledge of the action.
West's U.C.A. § 38-1-11(1, 2).
14. Mechanics' Liens <s=>5
Although courts have differing opinions
about how liberally to construe provisions
within their mechanics' lien statutes, the
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary
rules which have no demonstrable value in a
particular fact pattern.
15. Mechanics' Liens <s>310(3)
Laborer who was awarded reasonable
attorney fees in mechanics' lien foreclosure
action, and who prevailed on appeal, was
entitled to attorney fees reasonably incurred
on appeal.
16. Costs <®=>252
General rule is that when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.

David B. Thompson, Miller Vance &
Thompson PC, Park City, for Appellant.
David M. Bennion and Michael P. Petrogeorge, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges DAVIS, ORME, and
THORNE.
OPINION (For Official Publication)
DAVIS, Judge:
111 Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals
the trial court's denial of her motion for a
new trial, in which she argued that the failure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply
with Utah Code section 38-l-ll(4)(a) divested the trial court of jurisdiction. See Utah
Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
112 In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking foreclosure of a mechanics'
lien. Defendant filed her answer in December 2002 and an amended answer and counterclaim in February 2003; neither pleading
contained allegations that Plaintiff failed to
comply with the requirements of the Mechanics' Liens Act. On April 12, 2004, the
parties filed stipulations of fact with the district court, stipulating that
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the
statutory procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' lien
..; Mrs. Lamb does not defend against
Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim on
these statutory procedural grounds, but
simply challenges his right to receive payment of the amounts claimed in the lien.
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the
district court entered a memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004.
113 On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a
motion for reconsideration (which she now
dubs a motion for a new trial), in which she
argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the foreclosure action because Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens
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Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2004, issued
a ruling and order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on July 28, 2004,
entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor
of Plaintiff.

ply with requirements of section 38—1—
ll(4)(a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs lien foreclosure action.

[4-7] H7 Whether a procedure prescribed by statute is jurisdictional depends
on whether the procedure is "mandatory" or
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
"directory." Beaver County v. Utah State
114 The only issue before this court is Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996).
whether Plaintiffs failure to comply with sec- And while a procedure is generally considtion 38-l-ll(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens ered "mandatory" when "consequences are
Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to attached to the failure to act," Stahl v. Utah
hear Plaintiffs mechanics' lien foreclosure Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980),
action. If Plaintiffs failure to comply with the purpose of the statute and the legislasection 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest the trial ture's intent are of the utmost importance:
There is no universal rule by which direccourt of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that
tory provisions may, under all circumDefendant waived that issue, not only by
stances, be distinguished from those which
failing to assert it prior to trial but also by
are mandatory. The intention of the legisstipulation.
lature, however, should be controlling and
[1,2] 11 5 The determination of whether a
no formalistic rule of grammar or word
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
form should stand in the way of carrying
question of law, which we review for correctout the legislative intent.... The statute
ness, according no deference to the trial
should be construed according to its subcourt's determination. See Beaver County v.
ject matter and the purpose for which it
Qivest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,118, 31 P.3d 1147.
was enacted.
Questions of statutory interpretation are sim- Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County,
ilarly questions of law that are reviewed "for 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978) (alterations in
correctness, giving no deference to the dis- original) (quotations and citation omitted);
trict court's interpretation." Board of Educ. see also StaJil, 618 P.2d at 482 ("A statute is,
v. Sandy Ciiy Corp., 2004 UT 37,11 8, 94 P.3d of course, to be construed in light of its
234.
intended purposes."). Therefore, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore jurisdictional, if it is 4of the essence of the thing to
ANALYSIS
be done.'" Beaver County v. Utah State
131 H 6 Under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the
Tax Comvi'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting KenMechanics' Liens Act, lien claimants filing an
necott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other
action to enforce a lien must serve on the
quotations and citations omitted); see also
defendant-owner of a residence instructions
Projects Unlimited, hie. v. Copper State
relating to the owner's rights and a form
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah
affidavit along with the complaint. See Utah
1990) ("We must determine whether the rigCode Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant
orous interpretations urged by [defendants]
u
to section 38-1-1 l(4)(e), [i]f a lien claimant
are necessary to protect the interests of the
fails to provide to the owner of the residence
parties in the instant situation. Unless we
the instructions and form affidavit required
find that [Plaintiffs] alleged failures have
by [s]ubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be
compromised a purpose of the mechanic[s']
barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien
lien statute, those failures will be viewed as
upon the residence." Id. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e).
technical.. .").
On appeal, Defendant argues that the language of section 38-l-ll(4)(e) makes subsec[8] 118 The Mechanics' Liens Act was
tion 4(a) "mandatory," thereby making it a passed primarily to protect laborers who
jurisdictional provision that cannot be waived have added value to the property of another,
and can be i'aised at any time. Defendant but also to protect the property owner's right
thus contends that Plaintiffs failure to com- to convey clear title:
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[T]he purpose of the mechanics'] lien act
is remedial in nature and seeks to provide
protection to laborers and materialmen
who have added directly to the value of the
property of another by their materials or
labor. On the other hand, we recognize
that liens create an encumbrance on property that deprives the owner of his ability
to convey clear title and impairs his credit
State legislatures and courts attempt to balance these competing interests
through their mechanics'] lien statutes
and judicial interpretations thereof.

[i]f any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, . . . [the plaintiff] may commence a new action within
one year after the reversal or failure.
Id.
1110 Although Plaintiff may have failed to
serve Defendant with the instructions and
form affidavit required by section 38—1—
ll(4)(a), there is no question that he commenced his action within due time. "A civil
action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 (quotawith the court, or (2) by service of a sumtions and citations omitted); see also Mickelmons together with a copy of the complaint."
sen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah
Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). And section 38-1-11(1)
1989) ("[T]he mechanics'] lien law was enactgives lien claimants twelve months after comed for the benefit of those who perform the pletion of the contract, or 180 days after the
labor and supply the materials
"). We lien claimant last performed labor, to file
must therefore balance a laborer's right to be suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1).
paid for his labor and materials with the Here, Plaintiff performed labor at the resinegative impact that liens have on an owner's dence throughout the spring of 2002 and filed
credit and her ability to convey clear title. his complaint seeking foreclosure in October
Plaintiffs failure to serve Defendant with 2002. Because Plaintiffs action was timely
instructions and a form affidavit is irrelevant commenced and a dismissal for failure to
to the lien's negative impact, whereas invali- adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) would have
dating Plaintiffs right to be paid for his labor been a dismissal "otherwise than upon the
simply because he made a procedural error merits," id. § 78-12-40, Plaintiff could have
clearly contravenes the intended purpose of remedied his failure simply by commencing a
the Mechanics' Liens Act. Quite simply, the new action within one year after the dismissrequirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) have al.
nothing to do with "the essence of the thing
[9] U11 Unlike "mandatory" designato be done," Beaver County v. Utah State
tions,
"a designation is merely directory, and
Tax Comm% 919 P.2d at 552 (quotations and
therefore
not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with
citations omitted), and Plaintiffs failure to
a
view
merely
to the proper, orderly and
comply therewith did not compromise a purprompt conduct of the business, and by the
pose of the Act.
failure to obey no prejudice will occur to
119 Furthermore, the procedures set forth those whose rights are protected by the statin section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are not "mandatory" ute.'" Beaver County v. Utah State Tax
because no consequences attach to the failure Comm'ru 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Kennecott
to act. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481. The Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other quotaomission could have been remedied at any tions and citations omitted); see also Projects
time during the course of the proceedings, Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744-50 (upholding a
or, had the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs lien despite its errors because such errors
mechanics' lien foreclosure action for failure were technical and the defendant suffered no
to adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), the dis- prejudice). Therefore, Utah courts have
missal could have been easily addressed by held that certain procedures required by
either refiling or, depending on the timing, statute are inconsequential to a court's juristhrough Utah's savings statute. See Utah diction. For example, in Labelle v. McKay
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2002). Under Utah's Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d
113, the court determined that a mailing
savings statute,
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requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act
was not jurisdictional, stating that construing
the statute "in a manner to impose jurisdictional consequences on a claimant's every
procedural stumble is to misapprehend the
Medical Malpractice Act[]." Id. at 1114.
While the court "[did] not ignore the fact
that the requirement ... [was] mandatory,"
it stated that the mailing requirement was "a
minor component of the Malpractice Act's
prelitigation scheme. It serve[d] a wholly
informational role, and it is difficult to envision how [defendants] could be prejudiced by
being deprived of [the mailing]." Id. at 1117.
And in Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah 156,
84 P.2d 782 (1938), the court interpreted a
statute requiring a plaintiff to file an undertaking, or bond, securing costs contemporaneously with the complaint. The court held
that the statute, while affording no discretion
to the court, still did not create a jurisdictional prerequisite:
The language of [the statute], while positive and mandatory, when considered altogether makes the requirement only that
the undertaking be filed contemporaneously with the complaint. This certainly is no
stronger than the language of [other] statutes which require the bond to be filed
before commencing action. But we think
the legislature intended to make the requirement so positive and unequivocal as
to require the court to dismiss the suit if
the bond was not filed at least contemporaneously with the complaint if [a] motion to
dismiss was timely mad.e. Otherwise, the
court could continue to take jurisdiction.
Id., 84 P.2d at 784.1
1112 Like the statute construed in Kiesel,
the requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are
not conditions precedent to filing suit; they
simply require action contemporaneous with
the filing of the complaint. Furthermore,
like the Medical Malpractice Act construed in
Labelle, the Mechanics' Liens Act creates
1. Other jurisdictions have held that certain
"mandator}'" procedures are inconsequential to
a court's jurisdiction. See Hodusa Corp. v. Abrav
Constr. Co., 546 So.2d 1099, 1101 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1989) (interpreting a statute that required a
contractor to provide a residence owner an affidavit prior to bringing suit, the court stated that
"[although the furnishing of the affidavit is a
condition precedent to bringing an action to fore-

numerous procedural hurdles to enforcing a
lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2001)
(delineating the contents of a notice of lien,
and the time frame in which it must be filed);
id. § 38-1-11(1), (2) (delineating the time
frame in which suit and a lis pendens must
be filed). Section 38-l-ll(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act simply requires that certain instructions and a form affidavit be
served on the defendant; these requirements
are "wholly informational" and but "a minor
component" of the Mechanics' Liens Act. Labelle, 2004 UT 15 at 1 17, 89 P.3d 113. Finally, like the defendants in Labelle, it is difficult to envision how Defendant here was
prejudiced by being deprived of the instructions and form affidavit required by section
38-l-ll(4)(a). Defendant has not alleged
that she was prejudiced. In fact, she even
stipulated that she was not defending against
the lien foreclosure on statutory procedural
grounds, but simply "challenged] his right to
receive payment of the amounts claimed in
the lien." Quite simply, the requirements of
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are "directory, and
therefore not jurisdictional," as they merely
concern "the proper, orderly and prompt
conduct of the business" and Defendant has
suffered no prejudice. Beaver County v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552
(Utah 1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
[10-13] 1113 Defendant cites numerous
cases involving the Utah Governmental Immunity Act [UGIA], stating that the UGIA's
notice requirement is comparable to the requirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a). Such an
analogy is erroneous, as the UGIA's notice
requirement has nothing whatsoever to do
with service and mailing but instead provides
that a claim against the state is barred unless
notice thereof is filed with the state within
one year after the cause of action arises. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d^t02 (2004); Stahl
v. Utah Transit Autk, 618 P.2d 480, 481
close a mechanics'] lien, failure to do so does
not create a jurisdictional defect"); Campbell v.
Graham, 144 Colo. 532, 357 P.2d 366, 368 (1960)
(interpreting a statute that barred businesses that
had not filed trade name affidavits from prosecuting suits, the court rejected the proposition
that trade name filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit).
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(Utah 1980). In this way, the UGIA's notice
requirement is far more analogous to Utah
Code section 38-1-11(1) and (2), which mandates that a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and a lis pendens must be filed within
twelve months after completion of the contract or 180 days after the lien claimant last
performed labor. See Utah Code Ann. § 381-11(1), (2). And like a party's failure to
adhere to the UGIA's notice requirements, a
party's failure to timely file a mechanics' lien
foreclosure action and lis pendens is fatal and
cannot be remedied:
The penalty for not commencing an action
to enforce a mechanics'] lien within the
twelve-month period provided in section
38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien....
When a claimant fails to file the lis pendens within the twelve-month period, the
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is
rendered void as to everyone except those
named in the action and those with actual
knowledge of the action.
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 751 n. 13,
752 (Utah 1990). Utah courts have thus
ruled that failure to timely commence a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and file a lis
pendens, like failure to timely notify the state
of a claim against it, divests the court of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Interlake Distribs.,
Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295, 129799 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (holding that liens
were void because plaintiffs failed to file a lis
pendens); Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v.
Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah Ct.App.
1990) ("Failure to commence a timely mechanics'] lien foreclosure action divests the
court of jurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co. v.
Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289,
290-91 (Utah 1986) (holding that an untimely
mechanics' lien action is a jurisdictional issue
and "forecloses [the parties'] rights").

215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950) (relating to the legal
sufficiency of the notice of lien); see also
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743 ("Utah
courts have recognized that substantial compliance with [the Mechanics' Liens Act's] provisions is all that is required."). "Although
courts have differing opinions about how liberally to construe provisions within their mechanics'] lien statutes, the modern trend is
to dispense with arbitrary rules which have
no demonstrable value in a particular fact
pattern." Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at
744 (quotations and citation omitted). Here,
Plaintiff substantially complied with the Act,
to such an extent that Defendant did not
even notice Plaintiffs oversight until May
2004, more than eighteen months after the
complaint was filed and more than one month
after Defendant stipulated that Plaintiff had
"complied with all the statutory procedural
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing
on a mechanics' lien." Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the instructions and
form affidavit required by section 38-1-11(a)
would have conferred any demonstrable value here, but instead argued that such value
(or lack thereof) was "irrelevant" and "of no
import." Therefore, Plaintiffs failure to adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest
the trial court of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

[15,16] H15 Since Plaintiffs failure to
adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not divest
the trial court of jurisdiction, we affirm the
trial court's Final Order and Judgment in
favor of, and its award of reasonable attorney
fees and costs below to, Plaintiff. See Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (awarding
i^easonable attorney fees to the "successful
party" in a mechanics' lien foreclosure action). Because "[t]he general rule is that
when a party who received attorney fees
[14] U 14 Comparison between the rebelow prevails on appeal, the party is also
quirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a) and the
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on apUGIA is misplaced also because Utah courts
peal," Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams,
have specifically held that the UGIA is to be
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App.1991), we
"strictly construed," Great W. Cas. Co. v. remand the matter to the district court for
Utah Dep't of Transp, 2001 UT App 54,11 9, calculation of attorney fees reasonably in21 P.3d 240, whereas "substantial compliance curred on appeal.
with the [Mechanics' Liens Act] is all that is
required," Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295,
1116 Affirmed and remanded.
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1117 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME,
Judge.
1118 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judge.
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